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90-0857.S
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1993-11-06
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
DOGGETT v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 90-857. Argued October 9, 1991-Reargued February 24,
1992-Decided June 24, 1992
In February 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug
charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency
could secure his arrest. The DEA knew that he was later imprisoned
in Panama, but after requesting that he be expelled back to the
United States, never followed up on his status. Once the DEA
discovered that he had left Panama for Colombia, it made no further
attempt to locate him. Thus, it was unaware that he reentered this
country in 1982 and subsequently married, earned a college degree,
found steady employment, lived openly under his own name, and
stayed within the law. The Marshal's Service eventually located him
during a simple credit check on individuals with outstanding war-
rants. He was arrested in September 1988, 8- years after his
indictment. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that
the Government's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the District Court denied the
motion, and he entered a conditional guilty plea. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Held:The delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest violated his
right to a speedy trial. His claim meets the Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530, criteria for evaluating speedy trial claims. First,
the extraordinary 8- year lag between his indictment and arrest
clearly suffices to trigger the speedy trial enquiry. Second, the
Government was to blame for the delay. The District Court's finding
that the Government was negligent in pursuing Doggett should be
viewed with considerable deference, and neither the Government nor
the record provides any reason to reject that finding. Third, Doggett
asserted in due course his right to a speedy trial. The courts below
found that he did not know of his indictment before his arrest, and,
in the factual basis supporting his guilty plea, the Government
essentially conceded this point. Finally, the negligent delay between
Doggett's indictment and arrest presumptively prejudiced his ability
to prepare an adequate defense. The Government errs in arguing
that the Speedy Trial Clause does not significantly protect a defend-
ant's interest in fair adjudication. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307, 320-323; United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8; United
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312, distinguished. Nor does
Doggett's failure to cite any specifically demonstrable prejudice doom
his claim, since excessive delay can compromise a trial's reliability in
unidentifiable ways. Presumptive prejudice is part of the mix of
relevant Barker factors and increases in importance with the length
of the delay. Here, the Government's egregious persistence in failing
to prosecute Doggett is sufficient to warrant granting relief. The
negligence caused delay six times as long as that generally deemed
sufficient to trigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice
is neither extenuated, as by Doggett's acquiescence, nor persuasively
rebutted. Pp. 4-11.
906 F.2d 573, reversed and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined.